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OPINION 
                    
 
 
COWEN, Circuit Judge. 
 
 This asbestos-related personal injury action was tried 
to a jury in the United States District Court for the Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania.  The jury returned a verdict in favor 
of the plaintiff in excess of two million dollars.  On 
application by counsel, the district court granted plaintiff 
delay damages in the amount of $520,684.  In these consolidated 
appeals, we are called on to determine whether: (1) the district 
court abused its discretion by denying the defendant's challenge 
for cause of two jurors who allegedly evidenced bias against the 
defense; (2) the defendant has waived any claim that there was a 
violation of its statutory right to exercise peremptory 
challenges; (3) a denial or impairment of the exercise of 
peremptory challenges occurs if the defendant uses one or more 
challenges to remove jurors who should have been removed for 
cause; and (4) a per se reversal is the appropriate remedy for 
3 
such impairment or whether the defendant must also make a showing 
of prejudice.  Additionally, we are called upon to determine 
whether the district court committed an error of law by: (1) 
allowing plaintiff to introduce into evidence the prior testimony 
of an out of court expert witness from an unrelated state court 
action; (2) permitting plaintiff to introduce the interrogatory 
responses of a co-defendant who settled with the plaintiff prior 
to trial; (3) awarding plaintiff delay damages pursuant to Rule 
238 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure. 
 Because we conclude the district court abused its 
discretion in denying the defendant's challenge for cause of two 
jurors during voir dire, and because we conclude that this 
effected a denial or impairment of the defendant's statutory 
right to peremptory challenges requiring per se reversal, we will 
reverse the judgment of the district court and remand for a new 
trial on the issue of damages and liability.0  Since it is likely 
that the hearsay issues and the issue of delay damages may arise 
again during the new trial, we deem it appropriate to offer the 
district court guidance.  On these subjects, we conclude that the 
district court erred as a matter of law in allowing the 
introduction of hearsay evidence, but did not err in ruling that 
                     
0Defendant also argues that the district court abused its 
discretion in denying: (1) defendant a fair opportunity to prove 
the liability of a settled co-defendant by denying defendant's 
request for a continuance to subpoena product identification 
witnesses; and (2) defendant's request for a new trial on the 
grounds of excessiveness of the verdict.  Because of our decision 
to reverse the judgment of the district court and remand for a 
new trial on the issue of damages and liability, we need not 
address these arguments.   
4 
delay damages would be permitted when delay was caused by a 
judicial stay for which the plaintiff was not responsible. 
 
I. Factual and Procedural History 
 Alfred Kirk ("decedent"), a retired painter, died on 
July 5, 1988 at the age of 65 from malignant asbestos-induced 
mesothelioma.  Mrs. Sarah Kirk ("Kirk"), suing on behalf of 
herself and her deceased husband's estate, filed this diversity 
action against eight defendants, including Owens-Corning 
Fiberglas Corporation ("Owens-Corning").0  Kirk alleged that her 
husband's mesothelioma was caused by exposure to dust from 
asbestos products during his employment at the New York Shipyard 
in Camden, New Jersey, during the late 1950's and early 1960's. 
 By order dated July 29, 1991, the Judicial Panel on 
Multidistrict Litigation ("MDL") transferred all pending federal 
asbestos personal injury actions to the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania.  Pursuant to the MDL Panel's Order, all federal 
asbestos cases were stayed until the summer of 1993. 
 During jury selection, Owens-Corning challenged for 
cause two prospective jurors maintaining that the prospective 
jurors could not be impartial because they revealed considerable 
potential bias against Owens-Corning during voir dire.  The 
                     
0Of these eight defendants, four were bankrupt at the time of 
trial.  Of the four remaining defendants, Kirk settled with 
Garlock, Inc., GAF Corporation, and Owens-Illinois prior to 
trial.  Kirk also previously filed an asbestos-related lawsuit in 
the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas against Pittsburgh Corning 
Corporation, H.K. Porter Company, Inc., and Southern Textile 
Corporation.  Of these defendants, two were bankrupt and Kirk 
settled with Pittsburgh Corning prior to trial.   
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district court refused to strike these prospective jurors for 
cause, and Owens-Corning was then compelled to utilize two of its 
three peremptory strikes to remove these prospective jurors.0  
 On December 13, 1993, the trial (which was reverse-
bifurcated) began with issues of medical causation and damages. 
At the conclusion of this phase of the trial, the jury returned a 
verdict in favor of the Estate of Alfred Kirk for $1.2 million 
and in favor of Sarah Kirk for $810,000.  The liability phase of 
the trial commenced several days later before the same jury that 
had previously heard the damages phase.  At the conclusion of the 
liability trial, the jury returned a verdict against Owens-
Corning.  The jury also found that the decedent was not exposed 
to dust emitted by any asbestos-containing product manufactured 
by co-defendant Garlock, Inc. ("Garlock"). 
 Following the jury verdict, Owens-Corning moved for a 
new trial, alleging several trial errors including: (1) failing 
to strike two prospective jurors for cause; and (2) allowing the 
introduction of hearsay evidence.  This application was denied by 
                     
0We granted panel rehearing for the purpose of determining 
whether reversal is required when a party is compelled to expend 
or "waste" any number of its peremptory strikes to remove a 
prospective juror who should have been removed for cause.  In the 
original panel opinion, we concluded that Owens-Corning was 
prejudiced by the presence of these two jurors sitting on the 
jury.  We were shocked to learn, in a petition for rehearing in 
banc, that these two jurors never actually served because Owens-
Corning exercised peremptory strikes to remove these jurors.  In 
the original briefing, as well as during argument before this 
panel, both parties failed to inform the Court that these two 
jurors were never seated on the jury.  We are deeply disturbed by 
the fact that the briefing in this matter did not make clear to 
us this crucial fact and caused the Court to waste valuable time 
and judicial resources.  
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the district court.  Kirk filed an application for delay damages 
pursuant to Rule 238 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil 
Procedure, which the district court granted in the amount of 
$520,684.  Owens-Corning appeals from both the judgment and the 
award of delay damages. 
 Owens-Corning argues that the district court made 
several errors which require reversal of both the damage and 
liability phases of the trial, and that the district court 
improperly denied its post-verdict motion for a new trial. 
Finally, Owens-Corning claims that delay damages should not have 
been awarded to Kirk, because the delay was caused by the 
plaintiff filing simultaneous federal and state court actions 
and/or caused by the MDL order staying all asbestos cases, and 
was not caused by any bad faith on the part of Owens-Corning.  We 
will address each of these arguments seriatim. 
 The district court had jurisdiction to hear this case 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332.  Our jurisdiction is premised on 28 
U.S.C. § 1291 as the judgment entered was a final order.   
 
II.  Juror Challenges 
A.  Challenges for Cause 
 Owens-Corning argues that the district court erred in 
refusing to strike for cause two prospective jurors (juror #251 
and juror #45) who the defendant argues revealed considerable 
potential bias against it during voir dire.  As a consequence, 
Owens-Corning claims that it was forced to expend or "waste" two 
of its peremptory strikes to remove these two jurors from the 
7 
jury.  We review for abuse of discretion a district court's 
decision regarding a motion to dismiss a juror for cause.  United 
States v. Polan, 970 F.2d 1280, 1284 (3d Cir. 1992), cert. 
denied, __ U.S. __, 113 S. Ct. 1367 (1993) (citing United States 
v. Salamone, 800 F.2d 1216, 1226 (3d Cir. 1986) (the factual 
determination by the district court whether a juror can serve 
impartially is entitled to special deference when reviewed on 
appeal), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1030, 111 S. Ct. 685 (1991)). 
 Because the trial judge is in the best position to 
assess the credibility and demeanor of the prospective jurors, 
"district courts have been awarded ample discretion in 
determining how best to conduct the voir dire."  Waldorf v. 
Shuta, 3 F.3d 705, 710 (3d Cir. 1993) (citing Rosales-Lopez v. 
United States, 451 U.S. 182, 189, 101 S. Ct. 1629, 1635 (1991)). 
In determining whether a particular juror should be excused for 
cause, our main concern is "whether the juror holds a particular 
belief or opinion that will `prevent or substantially impair the 
performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his 
instructions and his oath.'"  Salamone, 800 F.2d at 1226 (citing 
Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424, 105 S. Ct. 844, 852 
(1985)).  "A juror is impartial if he or she can lay aside any 
previously formed `impression or opinion as to the merits of the 
case' and can `render a verdict based on the evidence presented 
in court.'"  Polan, 970 F.2d at 1284 (citing Irvin v. Dowd, 366 
U.S. 717, 723, 81 S. Ct. 1639, 1643 (1961)).  However, the 
district court should not rely simply on the jurors' subjective 
assessments of their own impartiality.  See Waldorf, 3 F.3d at 
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710 (district court relied too heavily on jurors' assurances of 
impartiality); see also Government of the Virgin Islands v. 
Dowling, 814 F.2d 134, 139 (3d Cir. 1987) (though a juror swears 
that he could set aside any opinion he might hold and decide the 
case on the evidence, a juror's protestation of impartiality 
should not be credited if other facts of record indicate to the 
contrary), aff'd, 493 U.S. 342, 110 S. Ct. 668 (1990).  
 Owens-Corning argues that prospective juror #251 should 
have been struck for cause because he worked with asbestos-
containing products for many years and indicated during voir dire 
that he was leaning in favor of the plaintiff.  Kirk argues that 
this prospective juror was properly placed on the jury because 
when questioned by both the district court and counsel whether he 
could render a fair and impartial verdict, the prospective juror 
responded in the affirmative. 
 We are troubled by the fact that a district judge, 
despite assurances of impartiality, allowed a prospective juror 
to serve in a mesothelioma case when the juror's background 
raised serious questions as to his ability to serve impartially.0 
                     
0Relevant portions of the voir dire of prospective juror # 251 
are as follows: 
 
Juror 251:   Well, two uncles had cancer, they were mechanics. 
Our union did a study on their members.  I am a 
mechanic, and it was like 97 percent of them 
tested had some problem with asbestos.  I have 
eaten a lot of it over the years brakes, clutches 
up until gets in the air hose, blows it out, you 
spit black dirt for two days. 
 . . . .  
 
Mr. Kristal (counsel for Kirk): Do you think that will affect  
your ability to listen to the 
9 
                                                                  
evidence and be fair to both 
sides in this case? 
 
Juror 251:   Well I could only try to be fair is all I could 
say.  I guess in a way I got to be a little one 
way, I'm probably high on the priority list 
myself.  I've been a mechanic since 1957, up until 
when they stopped using it, you know, you took a 
clutch out of a truck, hit it with the air hose 
and the whole shop is black. 
 . . . . 
 
Mr. Kristal:   If I didn't prove my case, or show that Mr. Kirk 
didn't have asbestos disease or I was unable to   
  show Owens-Corning Fiberglas was liable, 
would you be able to return a verdict against my 
client? 
 
Juror 251:   I wouldn't have any problems at all. 
 
Mr. Kristal:   [I]f I had proven the case, would you be able to 
find in favor of my client? 
 
Juror 251:   I might lean the other way because I have been 
there.  I know a lot of members who have been down 
that road, you know. 
 
Mr. Kristal:   Can you put [your past experience with asbestos] 
behind you and decide this case on what you hear 
in the courtroom from the witness stand and follow 
the Court's instructions? 
 
Juror 251:  I believe I could. 
 
Mr. Hewitt (counsel for Owens-Corning): Your two uncles had   
      
 cancer? 
 
Juror 251: Yes. 
 
Mr. Hewitt:  Do you believe those cancers were related to 
asbestos? 
 
Juror 251:  I don't know.  They both had lung cancer. 
 
Mr. Hewitt:   Were they around asbestos? 
 
Juror 251:   Mechanics the same as I am, both smoke, so it's 
anybody's guess. 
 
10 
                                                                  
App. 68-70. 
 
The Court:   He thinks he has asbestos coursing through his   
    system. 
 . . . . 
 
The Court:   I just want to clarify in my own mind, you have 
been exposed to the brake linings and flakes from 
brake linings? 
 
Juror 251:   Yes. 
 
The Court:   For many years now? 
 
Juror 251:   Yes, sir. 
 
The Court:   And you think that probably asbestos fibers made 
their way in through your own system because when 
you had the air hose -- 
 
Juror 251:   You see our Local, I am a member of the Local, and 
when all this asbestos problem came out, the Union 
started testing some of the older members.  It was 
like they finally knocked it off like 97 percent 
of the people tested, tested positive for 
asbestos.  And back then, we didn't know nothing 
about it.  You took brakes off the truck, took the 
air hose blew it off, disk, clutch, all asbestos, 
and I said yesterday, I probably had eaten a 
couple of pounds of it, and I have never been 
tested for it, but I have been subject to it. 
 
The Court:   If you are on this case you would be deciding 
certain questions, concerning somebody who died of 
asbestos exposure, how much money to award.  Do 
you think because of your own personal experience 
perhaps to a certain extent because of your 
uncles, you are not sure of the cause of the 
death, whether cigarettes or something to do with 
asbestos, do you think you could be fair or would 
you be inclined -- 
 
Juror 251:   Like I said, most of what I seen has been against 
it.  I would have to sit and listen to the case. 
If the one attorney can prove that it wasn't, I 
could handle that.  But at this point right now I 
only know the one side of it. 
 
The Court:   The way it's going to be, the plaintiff has the 
burden of proof, not the defendant.  And do you 
11 
Specifically, we note the following facts which raise substantial 
questions of the potential bias of juror #251: (1) during the 
course of his work history he had "probably eaten a couple of 
pounds of [asbestos]"; (2) he was a union shop steward for 35 
years and received one-sided literature from the union regarding 
asbestos; (3) he believed that 97% of the older workers in his 
local union had tested positive for asbestos in their system; (4) 
he had two uncles who died of lung cancer and although they were 
                                                                  
think you could decide the case fairly or do you 
think because of your own personal experiences you 
would be sort of caught up in it and tend to favor 
the plaintiff? 
 
Juror 251:   I think I could do it fairly.  I have been a shop 
steward for 35 years.  Lots of time I have to go 
against the company.  That didn't sit too well but 
I think I could sit and listen to the facts. 
 . . . . 
 
Juror 251:   I think I could weed through it.  Most of the   
information I have has been from the side of the 
Union coming with the asbestos.  And really, it's 
a one-sided argument. 
 . . . . 
 
Mr. Hewitt: I think you indicated earlier that you would lean 
a little -- 
 
Juror 251:   Well, at this point I would have to be [a] liar if 
I said to you -- the facts that I had lean in 
favor of the possibility or the possibility of it 
happening.  I haven't really had any, a lot of 
facts thrown to me, where it is not, and like I 
said, I would have to hear what they have to say, 
and determine from that.  I just can't crystal-
ball, say this gentleman is going to convince me 
that the client, his client did die from it.  I 
just have to listen to the facts, and just 
understand all the facts that I had about it have 
been the negative, from your standpoint, so I 
would have to weed out one or the other. 
 
App. at 76-79. 
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cigarette smokers, they had been exposed to asbestos during the 
course of their work lives; (5) he admitted in the first instance 
that he was leaning in favor of the plaintiff and against the 
asbestos company; (6) he believed that he was "probably high on 
the priority list" of getting an asbestos-related disease 
himself; and (7) he knew "a lot of [union] members" who 
presumably had asbestos-related medical problems. 
 Owens-Corning next argues that prospective juror #45 
should have been struck for cause because he had responded to the 
jury questionnaire that he could not be fair and later repeated 
at voir dire that he would have a difficult time being fair to 
the defendant.  Kirk counters by pointing out that when further 
questioned by the district court as to whether he could render a 
fair and impartial verdict, the prospective juror responded in 
the affirmative.0  Again, we are troubled because the second 
                     
0Relevant portions of the voir dire are as follows: 
 
The Court: In this case, sir, if you are on this jury can you 
well and truly try the case based on the evidence 
as it comes forth from the witness stand and not, 
with all respects [sic] to the media, based on TV, 
or radio or newspapers and all of that?  Do you 
think you could do that, sir? 
 
Juror 45:   Yes, I believe so, because it's possible it could 
be slanted one way or the other. 
 . . . . 
 
The Court:   So you answered that you could not be fair to 
companies that made, distributed, supplied and/or 
installed asbestos-containing products, what do 
you mean by that? 
 
Juror 45:   Basically I feel it's sort of immoral to knowingly 
produce something you know is going to cause a 
problem. 
13 
prospective juror: (1) stated in the jury questionnaire that he 
could not be fair to companies that made, distributed, supplied 
and/or installed asbestos-containing products; (2) felt it was 
immoral to produce asbestos if the company knew it was going to 
cause a problem; and (3) indicated that he could not be fair to 
                                                                  
 
The Court:  Do you think it's immoral -- I am not saying this 
is the case -- to produce something when they 
don't know anything is wrong with it, they don't 
know but it turns out later there is something 
wrong with it? 
 
Juror 45:   I feel if they do find out it should be corrected. 
 . . . . 
  
The Court:   [D]o you think you could be fair? 
 
Juror 45:   Yes. 
 
Mr. Hewitt:   One question, if the evidence is that Owens 
Corning knew that asbestos was hazardous would you 
have a tough time giving them a fair shake? 
 
Juror 45:   Yes, I would. 
 
The Court:   What do you mean by giving them a fair shake? 
Would you have a tough time coming up with a 
verdict in their favor if you know the [sic] under 
the evidence and the law they are liable? 
 
Juror 45:   Well -- 
 
The Court:   I would tell you if it comes in, if the evidence 
and the law did not demonstrate that the plaintiff 
proved their [sic] case, I am not saying that is 
not being fair to the defendant, you are being 
fair, just as you would be fair to the plaintiff 
if after fairly considering the evidence you find 
there's not a case made out, you would 
nevertheless find against her, you are abiding by 
your oath as a juror. 
 
Juror 45:   Whatever you say, yes. 
 
App. at 64-66. 
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the defendant if the evidence indicated that Owens-Corning knew 
that asbestos was hazardous.  Only after being repeatedly asked 
if he could be fair, the juror answered, "Whatever you say, yes." 
 Recently, we had the opportunity to decide a similar 
case involving a challenge to a district court's refusal to 
remove several jurors for cause.  Polan, 970 F.2d at 1284.  In 
that case, which involved a prosecution for conspiracy to 
distribute and the distribution of illegally prescribed drugs, 
counsel for the defendant challenged for cause three prospective 
jurors who revealed during voir dire that either they or members 
of their families were victims of drug abuse.  Id.  Juror #1 
revealed that one of his brothers had died of a drug overdose and 
another brother had served a lengthy prison term for drug 
offenses.  Id. n.2.  Juror #2 indicated that she had become 
dependent upon tranquilizers after experiencing a family tragedy. 
Id.  Juror #3 revealed that his son had abused alcohol and drugs 
in the past.  Id.  However, all three prospective jurors 
ultimately assured the court that their past experiences would 
not affect their decision making and that they would be fair and 
impartial.  After reviewing the record of the voir dire, we 
concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in 
refusing to strike those prospective jurors.  Polan, 970 F.2d at 
1284.  
 We find that Polan is distinguishable from the case 
before us.  In Polan, the defendant wanted the prospective jurors 
removed presumably because he believed that some of their past 
experiences would make them more likely to vote for conviction. 
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With regard to juror #1, we gave little weight to the theory that 
an individual whose one brother died of a drug overdose and whose 
other brother served a prison sentence for drug offenses would be 
more likely to convict a criminal defendant charged with drug 
distribution.  With regard to juror #2, we were not convinced 
that a person who became dependent on sedatives after the shock 
of a family tragedy would be more likely to convict an individual 
accused of distributing drugs.  Finally, with regard to juror #3, 
we gave little credence to the notion that a father who endured 
his son's alcohol and drug problems would be biased in favor of 
the prosecution.  Thus, when the district court in Polan credited 
the assurances of the three prospective jurors, it implicitly 
made two findings: (1) that the jurors were telling the truth and 
(2) despite the experiences and personal biases of the jurors, 
they could be fair and impartial, precisely because their past 
experiences and personal biases did not make them more likely to 
convict the defendant. 
 Here, Owens-Corning objected to jurors #251 and #45 
being seated on the jury because it believed that their personal 
biases regarding asbestos and asbestos companies would make them 
more likely to return a finding of liability and a large damage 
award against Owens-Corning.  Unlike the defendant in Polan, 
Owens-Corning's fear, that the prospective witnesses' past 
experiences and personal biases would affect their decision, was 
well-founded. 
 Juror #251 inhaled a considerable amount of asbestos, 
knew people who were suffering from asbestos-related diseases, 
16 
and thought himself likely to succumb to some asbestos-related 
disease in the future.  Thus, there was good reason to conclude 
that he would be more likely to return a large damage award 
because he sympathized with the plaintiff.  See Gumbs v. Pueblo 
International, Inc., 823 F.2d 768, 773 (3d Cir. 1987) ("[A] 
jur[or] may not abandon analysis for sympathy for a suffering 
plaintiff and treat an injury as though it were a winning lottery 
ticket.").  It is difficult to conceive of a juror who would be 
more partial to this plaintiff than juror #251.  Because juror 
#251's background is replete with circumstances which would call 
into question his ability to be fair to an asbestos manufacturer, 
we find that the district judge should have removed this juror 
for cause. 
 Juror #45 stated that he was biased against asbestos 
companies and felt it was immoral knowingly to produce harmful 
and defective products.  The danger existed that this juror would 
return a verdict of liability against Owens-Corning even if 
Owens-Corning's products were not responsible for the decedent's 
injuries.  We can think of few admissions more compelling in 
asbestos litigation than a prospective juror who acknowledges 
that he would have moral qualms about being fair to an asbestos 
manufacturer. 
 We conclude that juror #45 and especially juror #251 
could not serve fairly and impartially in light of their past 
experiences and personal biases.  The district court relied too 
heavily on the jurors' assurances of impartiality, and therefore 
abused its discretion.  A district court's refusal to excuse a 
17 
juror will not automatically be upheld simply because the 
district court ultimately elicits from the prospective juror that 
he will be fair and impartial, despite earlier statements or 
circumstances to the contrary.  The application of Owens-Corning 
to dismiss these two jurors for cause should have been granted. 
 
B.  Peremptory Challenges 
 Because the district court refused to strike these 
jurors for cause, Owens-Corning exercised two of its three 
peremptory strikes to remove these two prospective jurors from 
the jury.  Federal law provides that "[i]n civil cases, each 
party shall be entitled to three peremptory challenges."  28 
U.S.C. § 1870.  We must now decide whether: (1) the defendant has 
waived any claim that there was a violation of a statutory right 
to exercise peremptory challenges; (2) a denial or impairment of 
the exercise of peremptory challenges occurs if the defendant 
uses one or more challenges to strike jurors who should have been 
removed for cause; and (3) a per se reversal is the appropriate 
remedy for such impairment or whether the defendant must also 
make a showing of prejudice. 
 
1.  Waiver 
 Kirk argues that we may not now consider on appeal 
Owens-Corning's contentions that there was a violation of the 
statutory right to exercise peremptory strikes because the claim 
18 
was not properly preserved in the trial court.0  We have 
previously held that "[i]t is well established that failure to 
raise an issue in the District Court constitutes waiver of the 
argument."  Brenner v. Local 514, United Brotherhood of 
Carpenters, 927 F.2d 1283, 1298 (3d Cir. 1991). 
 Owens-Corning made the following argument before the 
district court in support of its motion for a new trial: 
[T]he district court is compelled to excuse a 
potential juror when bias is discovered 
during voir dire, as the failure to do so may 
require the litigant to exhaust peremptory 
challenges on persons who should have been 
excused for cause.  This result, of course, 
extinguishes the very purpose behind the 
right to exercise peremptory challenges. U.S. 
v. Daly, 716 F.2d 1499, 1507 (9th Cir. 1983) 
[citing United States v. Allsup, 566 F.2d 68, 
71 (9th Cir. 1977); United States v. Nell, 
526 F.2d 1223, 1229 (5th Cir. 1976)]. 
Brief of Owens-Corning in Support of its Motion for a New Trial 
at 3.0  In Daly, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
additionally stated that "[s]uch an infringement, if it causes a 
                     
0Alternatively, Kirk maintains that to the extent this issue was 
not waived, the argument must fail on the merits because Owens-
Corning failed to show that the jury was not impartial.  We will 
address this argument below.  See infra part II.B.3.  
0In Allsup, the court noted that impairment of the right to 
exercise peremptory challenges is usually deemed to be 
prejudicial error, without a showing of actual prejudice.  566 
F.2d at 71 (citing Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 219, 85 S. Ct. 
824, 835 (1965)).  In Nell, the court stated "it is error for a 
court to force a party to exhaust his peremptory challenges on 
persons who should be excused for cause, for this has the effect 
of abridging the right to exercise peremptory challenges."  526 
F.2d at 1229 (citing Swain).  Although Kirk later argues that 
Swain is no longer good law (and reliance on it is improper), at 
this stage of the inquiry we are not deciding the issues raised 
on the merits, but are simply ascertaining whether Owens-Corning 
has preserved this argument for appeal. 
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prejudicial diminution of peremptory challenges, constitutes 
reversible error."  Daly, 716 F.2d at 1507 (citing Hines v. 
Enomoto, 658 F.2d 667, 672 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 463 
U.S. 1211, 103 S. Ct. 3545 (1983); Allsup, 566 F.2d at 71; United 
States v. Boyd, 446 F.2d 1267, 1275 n.27 (5th Cir. 1971)).  We 
believe that Owens-Corning's reference to Daly during the course 
of its argument to the district court properly preserved for 
appeal the argument that impairment of a peremptory strike 
requires reversal.  Although Owens-Corning never specifically 
articulated that the impairment of a peremptory strike was a 
statutory violation, we are of the opinion that raising the 
question of the appropriate remedy for the impairment of 
peremptory challenges fairly places before us the question of 
whether a statutory right to peremptory challenges has been 
violated. 
 
2.  Denial or Impairment of Peremptory Challenges 
 We must next decide whether a denial or impairment of 
the exercise of peremptory challenges occurs if a defendant 
expends or wastes a peremptory challenge to strike a juror who 
should have been removed for cause.  The Supreme Court 
specifically declined to decide this issue in Ross v. Oklahoma, 
487 U.S. 81, 108 S. Ct. 2273 (1988), stating, "we need not decide 
the broader question whether, in the absence of Oklahoma's 
limitation on the `right' to exercise peremptory challenges, `a 
denial or impairment' of the exercise of peremptory challenges 
occurs if the defendant uses one or more challenges to remove 
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jurors who should have been excused for cause."0  Id. at 91 n.4, 
108 S. Ct. at 2280 n.4.  We do not believe this to be a difficult 
issue.  Here, the district court failed to strike two jurors who 
were challenged for cause, and we determine that this failure was 
error.  In order to ensure that these two prospective jurors who 
exhibited prejudice did not serve on the jury, Owens-Corning 
utilized two peremptory strikes.  We hold that compelling a party 
to use any number of its statutorily-mandated peremptory 
challenges to strike a juror who should have been removed for 
cause is tantamount to giving the party less than its full 
allotment of peremptory challenges.  Because 28 U.S.C. § 1870 
requires that each party shall be entitled to three peremptory 
challenges, "a denial or impairment" of that statutory right 
occurs whenever a party exercises a peremptory challenge to 
strike a prospective juror who should have been removed for 
cause.  Here, Owens-Corning's statutory right to three peremptory 
challenges was impaired.   
 
3.  Remedy 
 Relying on Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 85 S. Ct. 
824 (1965), overruled on other grounds by Batson v. Kentucky, 476 
U.S. 79, 106 S. Ct. 1712 (1986), Owens-Corning argues that the 
impairment or denial of the statutory right to exercise 
                     
0In Ross, the Court observed that under Oklahoma law, a party is 
required to expend a peremptory strike in order to preserve for 
appeal a challenge to the trial court's refusal to remove that 
juror for cause.  487 U.S. at 89, 108 S. Ct. at 2279.  There is 
no analogous requirement under federal law. 
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peremptory challenges requires the common law remedy of per se 
reversal.  The common law remedy of per se reversal has a long 
history and tradition in our judicial system.  As early as the 
1890's, the Supreme Court held in Gulf, Colorado & Santa Fe Ry. 
Co. v. Shane, 157 U.S. 348, 15 S. Ct. 641 (1895), that to 
"impanel a jury in violation of law, and in such a way as to 
deprive a party of his right to peremptory challenge, constitutes 
reversible error."  Id. at 351, 15 S. Ct. at 642.  In Shane, a 
civil defendant claimed that the trial judge committed error by 
failing to adhere to an Arkansas statute that provided each party 
three peremptory strikes to be used on a list of eighteen 
prospective jurors.  Because the trial judge confined the right 
to exercise peremptory challenges to only twelve prospective 
jurors, the Supreme Court concluded, without a showing of 
prejudice, that the trial court violated the statute.  Id. 
Similarly, in Harrison v. United States, 163 U.S. 140, 16 S. Ct. 
961 (1896), a criminal defendant argued that the trial judge 
erred in allotting him only three peremptory strikes, instead of 
the ten to which he was entitled under a federal statute. Because 
the defendant wanted to exercise five additional peremptory 
strikes, but was precluded from so doing, the Supreme Court 
reversed, observing that "[i]f [the defendant] was entitled to 
ten peremptory challenges, five persons unlawfully took part as 
jurors in his conviction."  Id. at 141, 16 S. Ct. at 961. Again, 
the Court did not require a showing of prejudice for this 
statutory violation.  See also Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 
370, 375-77, 13 S. Ct. 136, 138 (1892) (statutory right provided 
22 
by Arkansas law requiring defendant to be present during the 
exercise of peremptory strikes was violated, thus requiring per 
se reversal).  Swain continued the tradition of these cases.0 
 Kirk maintains that Batson has overruled Swain in its 
entirety, and that Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, 108 S. Ct. 2273 
(1988), requires a specific showing of prejudice -- that the jury 
                     
0Kirk cites to a case from the same era, Hopt v. People, 120 U.S. 
430, 7 S. Ct. 614 (1887), which she claims Owens-Corning concedes 
stands for the proposition that "an erroneous denial of [a] 
challenge for cause does not constitute reversible error if the 
party is not prejudiced."  Plaintiff/Appellee's Rehearing Reply 
Brief at 10 (June 12, 1995) (emphasis in original) (citing 
Supplemental Brief of Appellant at 4 (June 6, 1995)).  We are 
troubled by Kirk's argument.  First, Owens-Corning does not 
concede that a party must show prejudice (i.e., a biased jury) in 
order for reversal to occur.  Rather, Owens-Corning states that 
there can be no per se reversal unless the party proves that a 
peremptory strike has been impaired.  See Supplemental Brief of 
Appellant at 4 (June 6, 1995) (arguing there can be no per se 
reversal unless the party is prejudiced by "having to `waste' its 
peremptories on biased veniremembers.")   
 Second, Hopt does not stand for such a proposition.  In 
Hopt, the defendant argued that the trial judge made several 
errors in ruling on the competency of four jurors.  The trial 
judge denied all four challenges for cause.  However, the 
district attorney removed one juror peremptorily and the 
defendant removed two jurors with peremptory strikes.  The 
remaining juror was permitted to sit on the jury, but the Supreme 
Court ruled that the trial judge did not err in denying this 
challenge for cause.  With regard to the two jurors who were 
struck by the defendant, the Supreme Court concluded that 
assuming arguendo that the trial judge erred in refusing to 
strike two jurors for cause, there was no injury to the defendant 
because he utilized less than thirteen of the fifteen peremptory 
challenges provided by Utah statute.  Id. at 436, 7 S. Ct. at 
617.  As noted in part II.B.2 supra, in order to be entitled to 
per se reversal, a party must first show its statutory right to 
peremptory strikes was denied or impaired.  Because Hopt still 
had at least one peremptory strike remaining which he failed to 
use on the remaining juror, he failed to prove an impairment. 
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who actually sat was not impartial -- before reversal is 
required.0 
          In Swain, a black defendant raised a challenge to the 
prosecution's use of peremptory challenges to strike six black 
prospective jurors from the petit jury venire.  The Supreme Court 
announced a general rule that "[t]he denial or impairment of the 
right [to exercise peremptory challenges] is reversible error 
without a showing of prejudice."  Swain, 380 U.S. at 219, 85 S. 
Ct. at 835 (citing Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370, 13 S. 
Ct. at 136; Harrison v. United States, 163 U.S. 140, 16 S. Ct. 
961; Gulf, Colorado & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Shane, 157 U.S. 348, 15 
S. Ct. 641).  In addition, the Swain Court held that striking 
black members of the petit jury venire does not violate the law, 
id. at 221, 85 S. Ct. at 836, a determination which has since 
been conclusively overruled in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 
106 S. Ct. 1712 (1986).  See Batson, 476 U.S. at 89, 106 S. Ct. 
                     
0We understand Kirk to be making two separate arguments. First, 
Kirk asserts that assuming arguendo Owens-Corning has raised a 
claim of violation of a Seventh Amendment right to an impartial 
jury, this argument must fail on the merits because defendant did 
not object to the jury that was ultimately seated.  We need not 
address this point because Owens-Corning does not rely on any 
claim that the jury that decided this case was not impartial.  
See Supplemental Brief of Appellant at 10 (June 6, 1995) ("Owens-
Corning obviously cannot argue that it has been deprived of any 
Sixth Amendment right, nor has it asserted any analogous right 
under the Seventh Amendment.") (footnote omitted); Reply Brief of 
Defendant/Appellant at 5 n.3 (June 13, 1995) ("Owens-Corning does 
not claim that the jury that decided this case was not impartial, 
nor does Owens-Corning rest its entitlement to a new trial on the 
Seventh Amendment right to an impartial jury."). 
 Second, as we discuss below, Kirk maintains that Ross' 
requirement of showing jury impartiality should apply to 
statutory, as well as constitutional, claims of impairment of 
peremptory challenges.  
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at 1719 ("[T]he Equal Protection Clause forbids the prosecutor to 
challenge potential jurors solely on account of their race . . . 
.").  Batson removed a prosecutor's unbridled discretion to 
exercise peremptory challenges when the Equal Protection Clause 
is violated.  However, Batson did not reach the situation where 
the Equal Protection Clause is not implicated.  Indeed, Batson 
did not overrule the portion of Swain which held that denial or 
impairment of a peremptory strike is per se reversible error. 
Stated differently, if the prosecutor does not exercise 
peremptory strikes on the basis of race,0 an impairment of that 
statutory right to exercise peremptory challenges requires per se 
reversal. 
 Notwithstanding the conclusion that the per se reversal 
requirement of Swain survives after Batson, Kirk contends that a 
                     
0In recent years the Supreme Court has recognized additional 
circumstances under the Equal Protection Clause in which a trial 
judge may interfere with a party's exercise of peremptory strikes 
without the consequence of per se reversal.  See Powers v. Ohio, 
499 U.S. 400, 415, 111 S. Ct. 1364, 1373 (1991) (under Equal 
Protection Clause, prosecutor may not exercise peremptory strikes 
on the basis of race and criminal defendant may object to race-
based exclusion of jurors effected through peremptory challenges 
whether or not defendant and excluded jurors share the same 
race); Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 616, 111 
S. Ct. 2077, 2080 (1991) (race-based exercise of a peremptory 
challenge by a private litigant in a civil lawsuit violates equal 
protection rights of the challenged jurors); Georgia v. McCollum, 
505 U.S. 42, __, 112 S. Ct. 2348, 2359 (1992) (Equal Protection 
Clause prohibits a criminal defendant from engaging in racial 
discrimination in the exercise of peremptory strikes); J.E.B. v. 
Alabama Ex. Rel. T.B., __ U.S. __, __, 114 S. Ct. 1419, 1422 
(1994) (Equal Protection Clause forbids the exercise of 
peremptory challenges on the basis of gender as well on the basis 
of race).  Nevertheless, because the case before us does not 
involve any of these situations implicated by the Equal 
Protection Clause, a per se reversal would still be required 
under the dictates of Swain. 
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more recent Supreme Court case, Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, 
108 S. Ct. 2273 (1988), abolished the per se reversal remedy in 
requiring the party seeking reversal to demonstrate that the jury 
actually seated was not impartial.  In Ross, the petitioner 
argued that the failure of the trial court to strike a juror for 
cause and his subsequent "wasting" of a peremptory strike 
resulted in a violation of his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment 
right to an impartial jury, and his Fourteenth Amendment right to 
due process.  Ross, 487 U.S. at 85, 108 S. Ct at 2277.  As an 
initial matter, the Supreme Court noted that none of the jurors 
who actually sat and decided the case were challenged for cause 
by defense counsel.  Id. at 84, 108 S. Ct. at 2276. Additionally, 
there was nothing in the record to suggest that any juror who 
actually sat was not impartial.  Id. at 86, 108 S. Ct. at 2277.  
Moreover, the Court observed that any claim that the jury was 
biased must focus not on the challenged juror who was removed via 
the exercise of a peremptory strike, but rather on the jurors who 
ultimately sat.  Id.  The Supreme Court held: 
[The defendant] was undoubtedly required to 
exercise a peremptory challenge to cure the 
trial court's error.  But we reject the 
notion that the loss of a peremptory 
challenge constitutes a violation of the 
constitutional right to an impartial jury. We 
have long recognized that peremptory 
challenges are not of constitutional 
dimension.  They are a means to achieve the 
end of an impartial jury.  So long as the 
jury that sits is impartial, the fact that 
the defendant had to use a peremptory 
challenge to achieve that result does not 
mean the Sixth Amendment was violated.  We 
conclude that no violation of [the 
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defendant's] [constitutional] right to an 
impartial jury occurred. 
Id. at 88, 108 S. Ct. at 2278 (emphasis added) (citations and 
footnote omitted). 
 In reaching the question of whether the defendant's 
Fourteenth Amendment right of due process was violated, the Court 
observed: 
Because peremptory challenges are a creature 
of statute and are not required by the 
Constitution, it is for the State to 
determine the number of peremptory challenges 
allowed and to define their purpose and the 
manner of their exercise.  As such, the 
"right" to peremptory challenges is "denied 
or impaired" only if the defendant does not 
receive that which state law provides. 
Id. at 89, 108 S. Ct. at 2279 (citations omitted).  Under 
Oklahoma law, a defendant who disagrees with a trial court's 
ruling on a challenge for cause is required to exercise a 
peremptory challenge to remove the juror, or else the defendant 
waives the right to object on appeal.  Id.  Further, reversal is 
mandated only if the party exercises all of its peremptory 
strikes and an incompetent juror sits on the jury.  Id. 
Ultimately, the Court concluded, "[a]s required by Oklahoma law, 
[the defendant] exercised one of his peremptory challenges to 
rectify the trial court's error . . . .  But he received all that 
Oklahoma law allowed him, and therefore his due process challenge 
fails."  Id. at 91, 108 S. Ct. at 2279-80.  Thus, Ross holds that 
there is no constitutional violation mandating reversal unless a 
party can show that the jury was not impartial.  Ross is not 
controlling, however, because Owens-Corning alleges a statutory, 
not a constitutional, injury. 
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 Additionally, quite recently, we have spoken on this 
issue in a similar case.  In United States v. Ruuska, 883 F.2d 
262 (3d Cir. 1989), the defendant argued on direct appeal that 
his right to exercise a peremptory challenge was impaired, thus 
requiring a new trial.  In that case, the defendant was granted 
an additional peremptory strike, but was later precluded from 
exercising this strike.  The government argued that any error was 
harmless because a substantial right of the defendant was not 
affected, that is, the jury that ultimately sat was not 
impartial.  We rejected the government's invitation to perform a 
harmless error analysis.  Rather, we acknowledged that the right 
to peremptory challenges is a statutory, rather than a 
constitutional privilege, and that peremptory challenges may be 
"`withheld altogether without impairing the constitutional 
guaranties of an "impartial jury" and a fair trial.'"  Id. at 268 
(quoting Frazier v. United States, 335 U.S. 497, 505 n.11, 69 S. 
Ct. 201, 206 n.11 (1948)) (emphasis added).  We interpreted "the 
long line of Supreme Court authority that culminated with Swain 
to say that the denial or impairment of the right to peremptory 
challenges is reversible error per se."  Id. (quoting Swain) 
(citations omitted).  Though we did not explicitly mention Ross, 
we think it clear that we were distinguishing the case at bar 
from those cases where a constitutional injury has been alleged. 
Thus, a showing of prejudice is not required to reverse a verdict 
after demonstrating that a statutorily-mandated, peremptory 
challenge was impaired.  See also 9A Charles A. Wright and Arthur 
R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2483, at 124 (1995) 
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("The denial or impairment of the right [to peremptory 
challenges] is reversible error without a showing of specific 
prejudice.") (citing Swain, 380 U.S. at 219, 85 S. Ct at 835; 
Gulf, Colorado & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Shane, 157 U.S. 348, 15 S. 
Ct. 641 (1895); Carr v. Watts, 597 F.2d 830 (2d Cir. 1979); 
Kiernan v. Van Schaik, 347 F.2d 775 (3d Cir. 1965)). 
 We do not stand alone in holding that the denial or 
impairment of a peremptory strike requires per se reversal.  In 
United States v. Cambara, 902 F.2d 144 (1st Cir. 1990), the 
defendant argued that he was unfairly forced to expend a 
peremptory challenge to strike a juror who should have been 
excused for cause.  Id. at 147.  In that case, the defendant was 
entitled by statute to exercise ten0 peremptory strikes and the 
district court awarded an additional two challenges for a total 
of twelve.  The defendant had exhausted all twelve of his 
peremptory challenges, but he was not forced to expend one of the 
ten to which he was entitled under statute.  Instead, he was 
forced to waste one of the two additional strikes.  Although the 
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that impairment of an 
additional peremptory challenge does not violate any rights of 
the defendant, the court recognized that "restricting a 
defendant's use of the lawful number of peremptory strikes is 
reversible error if a challenge for cause is erroneously denied." 
Id. at 147-48 (citations omitted).  See also Carr v. Watts, 597 
                     
0Pursuant to Rule 24 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 
"[i]f the offense charged is punishable by imprisonment for more 
than one year . . . the defendant [is entitled] to 10 peremptory 
challenges."  Fed. R. Crim. P. 24(b).  
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F.2d 830, 833 (2d Cir. 1979) (error in denying challenge for 
cause that compels unnecessary use of peremptories is reversible 
error);0 United States v. Rucker, 557 F.2d 1046, 1049 (4th Cir. 
1977) (erroneous refusal to excuse a juror for cause constitutes 
reversible error despite defendant's use of peremptory challenge 
where district court's error reduced number of peremptory 
challenges); United States v. Nell, 526 F.2d 1223, 1229 (5th Cir. 
1976) (same) (citing Swain).0 
 Furthermore, some post-Ross cases from other courts of 
appeals, while not concluding that a per se reversal is mandated, 
have recognized that Ross only speaks to constitutional 
challenges and does not necessarily control non-constitutional or 
statutory errors.  In United States v. Beasley, 48 F.3d 262 (7th 
Cir. 1995), the district court refused to remove three challenged 
jurors for cause, whereupon the defendant exercised two of his 
ten remaining statutorily-mandated peremptory strikes to remove 
two of the jurors.  The defendant then objected to the seating of 
the third juror.  The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 
ultimately concluded that the district court did not abuse its 
discretion in failing to strike the three jurors for cause. 
However, the Beasley court did note that because the peremptory 
strikes were designated as a matter of federal law, it could be 
                     
0As in the case at bar, the party in Carr argued that the 
district court impermissibly impaired its statutory right under 
28 U.S.C. § 1870 to the exercise of three peremptory challenges. 
Id. at 831.   
0We acknowledge that some of these cases were decided prior to 
Ross.  However, because Ross is distinguishable, we believe that 
reliance on pre-Ross cases is not inappropriate. 
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argued that a district court's erroneous refusal to strike a 
juror for cause would deprive the defendant of a statutory 
peremptory challenge.  Id. at 268 n.5.  Additionally, in United 
States v. Munoz, 15 F.3d 395 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, __ U.S. 
__, 114 S. Ct. 2149 (1994), the district court refused to remove 
a juror who was challenged for cause, thus requiring the 
defendant to exercise a peremptory strike.  Although concluding 
that the district court did not abuse its discretion, the Court 
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit observed that Ross applied 
constitutional standards in reviewing a state criminal 
conviction.  It expressed doubt as to whether Ross controls a 
case on direct appeal and further noted that reversal may be 
proper even though the error alleged at trial was not of 
constitutional magnitude.  Id. at 398 n.1.  The Munoz court 
continued, "[w]hile peremptory challenges . . . may not be 
constitutionally required, it does not follow that a trial 
court's wrongful reduction of the number so provided is not 
reversible error on direct appeal."  Id.  
 Kirk argues that all other courts of appeals that have 
addressed the constitutional implications of the use of 
peremptory challenges, whether raised in habeas corpus 
proceedings0 or in direct criminal appeals,0 have limited their 
                     
0The habeas corpus cases are distinguishable because a federal 
court may overturn a state judgment only for constitutional 
violations.  See Callins v. Collins, 998 F.2d 269, 277 (5th Cir. 
1993) (requires a showing of prejudice when alleging due process 
violation); Bannister v. Armontrout, 4 F.3d 1434, 1443 (8th Cir. 
1993) (citing Ross for proposition that one must show prejudice 
when alleging a Sixth Amendment violation), cert. denied, __ U.S. 
__, 115 S. Ct. 418 (1994); Heath v. Jones, 941 F.2d 1126, 1132-33 
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inquiry and review to the impartiality of the jury selected.  We 
agree that all courts subsequent to Ross have correctly required 
a showing of prejudice in response to an alleged constitutional 
error before concluding that reversal is warranted.  However, 
Kirk has failed to point to a single case from any court of 
appeals that recognizes the distinction between constitutional 
and statutory violations, and holds that Ross requires a showing 
of prejudice for a statutory violation.0  For the reasons stated 
                                                                  
(11th Cir. 1991) (in order to prevail on claim of denial of fair 
and impartial jury, one must show prejudice), cert. denied, 502 
U.S. 1077, 112 S. Ct. 981 (1992); Gaskins v. McKellar, 916 F.2d 
941, 948-49 (4th Cir. 1990) (citing Ross for proposition that one 
must demonstrate prejudice when alleging a Sixth Amendment 
violation), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 961, 111 S. Ct. 2277 (1991).  
0These cases fail to recognize the key distinction between 
violation of the constitutional right to an impartial jury and 
the deprivation of the federal statutory right to peremptory 
challenges.  See United States v. Alexander, 48 F.3d 1477, 1483-
84 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing Ross for proposition that one must 
show prejudice in order to prevail on a Sixth Amendment claim); 
United States v. Mendoza-Burciaga, 981 F.2d 192, 197-98 (5th Cir. 
1992) (no constitutional error absent a showing of prejudice), 
cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 114 S. Ct. 356 (1993); United States v. 
Farmer, 923 F.2d 1557, 1565 (11th Cir. 1991) (same).  
0Although Kirk cites Kotler v. American Tobacco Co., 926 F.2d 
1217 (1st Cir. 1990), vacated on other grounds, __ U.S. __, 112 
S. Ct. 3019 (1992), reaffirmed, 981 F.2d 7 (1st Cir. 1992), for 
the proposition that one must first show prejudice in the context 
of a statutory violation, Kotler does not stand for that 
proposition.  In that case, the court held that absent a showing 
that a peremptory strike was impaired or denied, no reversal is 
mandated.  Id. at 1226-27.  We have recognized a similar 
requirement, see supra part II.B.2, that is, before one may 
receive the remedy of reversal, one must first prove that the 
right to exercise peremptory strikes has been denied or impaired. 
 Additionally, Kirk cites United States v. McIntyre, 997 
F.2d 687, 698 n.7 (10th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 114 
S. Ct. 736 (1994), for the proposition that a non-constitutional 
or statutory violation only requires a harmless error analysis, 
and not per se reversal.  In that case, the court held that the 
district court did not abuse its discretion in failing to excuse 
the juror for cause.  Id. at 698.  In dicta, the court noted that 
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above, we find Ross and other cases dealing with alleged 
constitutional errors to be distinguishable from the case at bar. 
 Finally, Kirk argues that even if the requirement 
imposed by Ross of showing jury bias only applies to 
constitutional claims, its logic should nonetheless be extended 
to any statutory impairment claim, that is, a party should always 
be required to show that the jury that actually sat was biased. 
We decline to extend Ross in the absence of further guidance from 
the Supreme Court.  We hold that the remedy for impairment or 
denial of the statutory right to exercise peremptory challenges 
is per se reversal without any requirement of proving prejudice.  
 
III.  Prior Testimony of Out of Court Witness 
                                                                  
even if the district court had erroneously denied the challenge 
for cause, no reversal was required because the defendant had 
failed to show that the jury was impartial.  Id. at 698 n.7.  To 
the extent that this dicta is in tension with our resolution of 
this matter, we reject this argument. 
 Although Kirk did not bring it to our attention, we are 
aware of a recent case from the Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit that is at odds with our decision today.  In United 
States v. Annigoni, __ F.3d __, 1995 WL 338649 (9th Cir. 1995), 
the defendant attempted to exercise a peremptory strike against 
an Asian male, and the district court denied the strike based on 
Georgia v. McCollom, __ U.S. __, 112 S. Ct. 2348, 2357 (1992). 
The court concluded that the district court erred in disallowing 
the peremptory strike, because there was an insufficient factual 
basis from which to conclude that the strike had been motivated 
by racial prejudice.  Annigoni, 1995 WL 338649, at *4.  Turning 
to the remedy for such an erroneous denial of a peremptory 
strike, the court, in part relying on Ross, concluded that a 
"harmless error" analysis rather than per se reversal was 
mandated.  We respectfully disagree with that decision.  Because 
Ross does not control the case of a statutory violation, any 
reliance on Ross in this context is misplaced. 
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 During the liability phase of the trial, Owens-Corning 
offered the expert testimony of Dr. Harry Demopoulos to prove 
that the overwhelming majority of asbestos-induced mesotheliomas 
are caused by crocidolite asbestos fiber.  This testimony 
supported Owens-Corning's defense that its product, Kaylo, which 
did not contain crocidolite fiber, could not have caused the 
decedent's mesothelioma.  Over Owens-Corning's objection, Kirk 
was permitted to read to the jury the prior trial testimony of 
Dr. Louis Burgher from an unrelated New Jersey State Court 
asbestos action in 1992.  In that case, Dr. Burgher had been an 
expert witness for Owens-Corning and testified on cross-
examination that it was possible for mesothelioma to be caused by 
chrysotile fibers contaminated with tremolite.  Kirk was clearly 
attempting to discredit Owens-Corning's defense offered through 
Dr. Demopoulos by revealing to the jury that Owens-Corning's 
expert witness in a previous case voiced a different and 
contradictory opinion as to which asbestos fibers cause 
mesothelioma.  After the jury returned a verdict in favor of 
Kirk, Owens-Corning made a post-trial motion for a new trial 
based in part on the alleged admission of hearsay evidence, i.e., 
the prior testimony of Dr. Burgher in an unrelated case.  The 
district court denied this motion. 
 Normally, when a new trial is sought by reason of a 
district court's alleged error in allowing the introduction of 
evidence, we review for abuse of discretion.  Lippay v. Christos, 
996 F.2d 1490, 1496 (3d Cir. 1993) (citing Link v. Mercedes-Benz, 
788 F.2d 918, 921-22 (3d Cir. 1986)).  However, where as here the 
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ruling on admissibility of hearsay evidence implicates the 
application of a legally set standard, our review is plenary. 
Id.; see also United States v. McGlory, 968 F.2d 309, 332 (3d 
Cir. 1992). 
 Owens-Corning argues that the district court erred in 
allowing the jury to hear this evidence in light of the fact that 
it was hearsay.  Although the record is at best vague as to what 
the district court's basis was for allowing such testimony, Kirk 
attempts to justify its admission under two distinct theories --
either the testimony was not hearsay pursuant to Rule 
801(d)(2)(C) of the Federal Rules of Evidence or it was hearsay, 
but subject to an exception pursuant to Rule 804(b)(1).0 
 
A.  Rule 801(d)(2)(C) of the Federal Rules of Evidence 
 Kirk first attempts to justify the district court's 
admission of the prior trial testimony of Dr. Burgher by arguing 
it is an admission by a party opponent since it is a statement by 
a person authorized by Owens-Corning to speak concerning 
mesothelioma and is thus not hearsay.  See Fed. R. Evid. 
801(d)(2)(C)0; see also Precision Piping v. E.I. du Pont de 
                     
0Alternatively, Kirk argues that assuming arguendo it was error 
to admit the testimony of Dr. Burgher, it was harmless error 
because the weight of the medical testimony of Kirk's other 
witnesses was overwhelming.  In light of our decision to remand 
for a new trial because the jury was improperly constituted, we 
need not address whether any evidentiary errors may be harmless. 
0Rule 801(d) of the Federal Rules of Evidence states in relevant 
part: 
 
 (d) Statements which are not hearsay.  A statement is 
not hearsay if -- 
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Nemours, 951 F.2d 613, 619 (4th Cir. 1991) (authority in the 
context of 801(d)(2)(C) means "authority to speak" on a 
particular subject on behalf of someone else).  In her brief, 
Kirk argues that Dr. Burgher was authorized by Owens-Corning to 
offer his expert opinion about medical literature regarding 
mesothelioma and fiber type.  Appellee's Brief at 21.  At oral 
argument, Kirk suggested that the testimony of any expert that 
Owens-Corning has previously used in a trial can be used in 
future litigation against it as an authorized admission. 
 In support of this proposition, Kirk cites Collins v. 
Wayne Corp., 621 F.2d 777, 782 (5th Cir. 1980), which held that 
deposition testimony of an expert employed by a bus manufacturer 
to investigate an accident was an admission under 801(d)(2)(C). 
However, in that case the court made a finding that the expert 
witness was an agent of the defendant and the defendant employed 
the expert to investigate and analyze the bus accident.  Id.  The 
court determined that in giving his deposition, the expert was 
performing the function that the manufacturer had employed him to 
perform.  As such, the court concluded that the expert's report 
of his investigation and his deposition testimony in which he 
explained his analysis and investigation was an admission of the 
defendant.  Id.; see also Theriot v. J. Ray McDermott & Co., 
Inc., 742 F.2d 877, 882 (5th Cir. 1984) (citing Collins v. Wayne 
                                                                  
 (2) Admission by party-opponent.  The statement is 
offered against a party and is . . . 
 (C) a statement by a person authorized by the party to 
make a statement concerning the subject. 
 
Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(C) (emphasis added). 
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Corp., 621 F.2d 777, 781-82 (5th Cir. 1980)) (explaining that 
Collins holds that "an agent's statement, made within the scope 
of his authority . . . is admissible against the principal as an 
admission").   
 Kirk misconstrues the entire premise of calling expert 
witnesses.  In theory, despite the fact that one party retained 
and paid for the services of an expert witness, expert witnesses 
are supposed to testify impartially in the sphere of their 
expertise.  Thus, one can call an expert witness even if one 
disagrees with the testimony of the expert.  Rule 801(d)(2)(C) 
requires that the declarant be an agent of the party-opponent 
against whom the admission is offered, and this precludes the 
admission of the prior testimony of an expert witness where, as 
normally will be the case, the expert has not agreed to be 
subject to the client's control in giving his or her testimony. 
See Sabel v. Mead Johnson & Co., 737 F. Supp. 135, 138 (D. Mass 
1990).  Since an expert witness is not subject to the control of 
the party opponent with respect to consultation and testimony he 
or she is hired to give, the expert witness cannot be deemed an 
agent.  See Restatement (Second) of Agency § 1 cmt. a (1958) 
("The relation of agency is created as the result of conduct by 
two parties manifesting that one of them is willing for the other 
to act for him subject to his control, and that the other 
consents so to act.") 
 Because an expert witness is charged with the duty of 
giving his or her expert opinion regarding the matter before the 
court, we fail to comprehend how an expert witness, who is not an 
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agent of the party who called him, can be authorized to make an 
admission for that party.0  See Michael H. Graham, Federal 
Practice and Procedure: Evidence § 6722, at 502 (Interim Edition 
1992) (the authority of the agent to speak as to a subject must 
be established at trial).  We are unwilling to adopt the 
proposition that the testimony of an expert witness who is called 
to testify on behalf of a party in one case can later be used 
against that same party in unrelated litigation, unless there is 
a finding that the expert witness is an agent of the party and is 
authorized to speak on behalf of that party.  Accordingly, we 
find Dr. Burgher's prior trial testimony to be hearsay in the 
context of the present trial. 
 
B.  Rule 804(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Evidence   
 Because the testimony of Dr. Burgher is hearsay, we 
must next inquire whether it falls within any of the hearsay 
exceptions enumerated in the Federal Rules of Evidence.  Kirk 
argues that Dr. Burgher's testimony falls within the former 
testimony hearsay exception of Rule 804(b)(1).  In order for 
former testimony to be admissible as an exception to the hearsay 
rule: (1) the declarant must be unavailable; (2) testimony must 
be taken at a hearing, deposition, or civil action or proceeding; 
                     
0In the case before us, unlike Collins, there was no explicit 
finding on the record that Dr. Burgher was an agent of the 
defendant.  To the extent that Collins holds that an expert 
witness who is hired to testify on behalf of a party is 
automatically an agent of that party who called him and 
consequently his testimony can be admitted as non-hearsay in 
future proceedings, we reject this rule. 
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and (3) the party against whom the testimony is now offered must 
have had an opportunity and similar motive to develop the 
testimony by direct, cross, or redirect examination.  See Fed. R. 
Evid. 804(a)(5), (b)(1).0  Because Dr. Burgher testified in open 
court during the state court action, no one disputes that the 
second element has been satisfied. 
 Regarding the first element, we note that it is an 
abuse of discretion for a district court to admit former 
testimony into evidence under Rule 804(b)(1) without a finding of 
unavailability.  See O'Banion v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 
968 F.2d 1011, 1014 (10th Cir. 1992) (district court abused its 
discretion in admitting former testimony of expert where there 
                     
0Rule 804 of the Federal Rules of Evidence states in relevant 
part: 
 
(b) Hearsay exceptions.  The following are not excluded by the 
hearsay rule if the declarant is unavailable as a witness: 
 
(1) Former testimony.  Testimony given as a witness at another 
hearing of the same or different proceeding, or in a deposition 
taken in compliance with law in the course of the same or another 
proceeding, if the party against whom the testimony is now 
offered, or, in a civil action or proceeding, a predecessor in 
interest, had an opportunity and similar motive to develop the 
testimony by direct, cross, or redirect examination. 
 
Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(1) (emphasis supplied). 
 
"Unavailability" is defined in Rule 804 as follows: 
 
(a) Definition of unavailability.  "Unavailability as a witness" 
includes situations in which the declarant -- 
 
(5) is absent from the hearing and the proponent of a statement 
has been unable to procure the declarant's attendance . . . by 
process or other reasonable means. 
 
Fed. R. Evid. 804(a)(5) (emphasis supplied). 
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was no showing of unavailability).  Because there was no finding 
on the record as to unavailability, if the district court based 
admitting this testimony on Rule 804(b)(1), we hold that the 
district court abused its discretion in allowing this former 
testimony into evidence. 
 Normally, our inquiry would end here after determining 
that former testimony cannot be admitted absent specific findings 
of unavailability.  However, because of the likelihood that an 
offer may be made during the retrial of this matter to admit this 
testimony as former testimony, we believe further discussion is 
warranted. 
 We observe that it is the proponent of the statement 
offered under Rule 804 who bears the burden of proving the 
unavailability of the declarant.  United States v. Eufracio-
Torres, 890 F.2d 266, 269 (10th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 
U.S. 1008, 110 S. Ct. 1306 (1990) (citing Ohio v. Roberts, 448 
U.S. 56, 65, 100 S. Ct. 2531, 2538-39 (1980)); 2 John William 
Strong et al., McCormick on Evidence § 253, at 134 (4th ed. 1992) 
("The proponent of the hearsay statement must . . . show that the 
witness cannot be found").  We can find nothing in the record 
that indicates any "reasonable means" employed by Kirk to procure 
the services of Dr. Burgher so that he might testify at trial. 
See McCormick § 253, at 134 (mere absence of the declarant, 
standing alone, does not establish unavailability); see also 
Moore v. Mississippi Valley State University, 871 F.2d 545, 552 
(5th Cir. 1989) (deposition inadmissible in civil trial where no 
evidence to establish unavailability offered). 
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 Kirk claims that Dr. Burgher, who is a resident of 
Nebraska, was beyond her ability to subpoena and was thus 
unavailable.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(c)(3)(A)(ii).0  However, 
Kirk made no independent attempt to contact Dr. Burgher, offer 
him his usual expert witness fee, and request his attendance at 
trial.0  Because Dr. Burgher was never even as much as contacted, 
Kirk has failed to prove that she used "reasonable means" to 
enlist his services. 
                     
0Rule 45 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states in 
relevant part: 
 
(c) Protection of Persons Subject to Subpoenas. 
   (3)(A) On timely motion, the court by which a subpoena was 
issued shall quash or modify the subpoena if it -- 
         (ii) requires a person who is not a party or an officer 
of a party to travel to a place more than 100 miles from the 
place where that person resides, is employed or regularly 
transacts business in person . . . . 
 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(c)(3)(A)(ii).   
0At oral argument, Kirk argued that it was the responsibility of 
Owens-Corning to locate and contact Dr. Burgher and establish his 
availability because the district court requested Owens-Corning 
to determine whether he would be available to testify. To the 
extent that the district court placed the burden on Owens-Corning 
to establish the unavailability of Dr. Burgher, the district 
court made an error of law in shifting the burden of proof.  Kirk 
then articulated what we term a "convenience" argument, that is, 
she argued that Dr. Burgher was Owens-Corning's expert and Owens-
Corning was in a better position to locate Dr. Burgher because it 
had Dr. Burgher's telephone number. To the extent that Kirk is 
advocating that Owens-Corning should undertake the task of 
locating a witness for Kirk so that she may use that testimony 
against Owens-Corning, we reject any such notion.  For the same 
reasons we protect an attorney's work product from discovery, see 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3); Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 511, 
67 S. Ct. 385, 394 (1947) ("Inefficiency, unfairness, and sharp 
practices would inevitably develop . . . .  The effect on the 
legal system would be demoralizing.  And the interests of the 
clients and the cause of justice would be poorly served."), we do 
not believe that Owens-Corning had any duty to assist Kirk in 
preparing her case. 
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 We next address whether Owens-Corning had an 
opportunity and similar motive to develop the testimony of Dr. 
Burgher at the prior unrelated state court trial.0  The 
similarity of motive requirement assures "that the earlier 
treatment of the witness is the rough equivalent of what the 
party against whom the statement is offered would do at trial if 
the witness were available to be examined by that party."  United 
States v. Salerno, 937 F.2d 797, 806 (2d Cir. 1991); see also 2 
Steven A. Saltzburg & Michael M. Martin, Federal Rules of 
Evidence Manual 400 (5th ed. 1990) ("The way to determine whether 
or not motives are similar is to look at the similarity of the 
issues and the context in which the opportunity for examination 
previously arose."). 
 There was no finding by the district court that Owens-
Corning had an opportunity and similar motive to examine Dr. 
Burgher.  Further, during oral argument, counsel for Kirk 
indicated that the only document before the district court from 
the state court trial was the transcript of Dr. Burgher's 
testimony.  The district court did not have the complaint, 
answer, or jury charge from the state court proceedings.  Thus, 
even if the district court had attempted to make a finding as to 
opportunity and similar motive, it would have been unable to 
reach a well-reasoned conclusion based on the information before 
                     
0Again, although we need not reach this issue absent a finding of 
unavailability, because of the likelihood that an offer may be 
made during the retrial to admit this evidence as former 
testimony, we believe further discussion is warranted. 
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the district court.0  See McCormick § 304, at 317 (courts must 
look to the operative issue in the earlier proceeding). 
Accordingly, we must conclude that Kirk failed to prove that 
Owens-Corning had an opportunity and similar motive to examine 
Dr. Burgher. 
 
   IV. Introduction of Interrogatory of Settled Co-
Defendant 
 Kirk settled the instant action with Garlock and 
several other defendants prior to trial.  At trial, Owens-Corning 
sought in its cross-claim to prove that the decedent was exposed 
to products made by Garlock.  If the jury were to conclude that 
the decedent's injuries had been caused in whole or part by 
exposure to Garlock products, then Owens-Corning could eliminate 
or substantially reduce its liability.  Conversely, it was in 
Kirk's financial interest to prove that the decedent was exposed 
to only Owens-Corning products.  In an effort to rebut the 
testimony of an Owens-Corning witness who testified that Garlock 
gaskets were present in the New York shipyard during the years 
that the decedent worked there, Kirk read into evidence an 
interrogatory response which was prepared and filed by Garlock in 
                     
0For instance, the statement elicited from Dr. Burgher during 
cross-examination at the state trial may not have warranted 
redirect by Owens-Corning in light of its theory of defense.  See 
McCormick § 302, at 307 ("Circumstances may differ sufficiently 
between the prior hearing and the present trial to bar admission 
. . . as where questions on a particular subject would have been 
largely irrelevant at the earlier proceeding.").  Because we do 
not have the pleadings, we cannot determine whether an 
opportunity and similar motive existed.   
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defense of this action.  Of course, at the time this 
interrogatory was read to the jury, Garlock was no longer a party 
to this lawsuit.  Specifically, counsel for Kirk read the 
following statement to the jury: 
Since Garlock products are bonded and/or 
encapsulated and treated in such a manner 
that they do not, when used in the manner for 
which they were intended, emit meaningful 
levels of asbestos dust and fibers, no 
restrictions or limitations on use are 
necessary. 
App. at 513.  In response to Owens-Corning's closing remarks, 
counsel for Kirk reminded the jury: 
I read you from the Garlock interrogatory, 
Garlock product is bonded, encapsulated, it 
does not emit dust. 
App. at 545. 
 Owens-Corning argues that the district court erred in 
admitting this interrogatory response because the interrogatory 
answer was pure hearsay.  Kirk attempts to justify the admission 
of this interrogatory response under the catch-all or residual 
exception, Rule 803(24) of the Federal Rules of Evidence.0  As 
                     
0Rule 803 of the Federal Rules of Evidence states in relevant 
part: 
 
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though 
the declarant is available as a witness: 
 . . . 
 
Other exceptions.  A statement not specifically covered by any of 
the foregoing exceptions but having equivalent circumstantial 
guarantees of trustworthiness, if the court determines that (A) 
the statement is offered as evidence of a material fact; (B) the 
statement is more probative on the point for which it is offered 
than any other evidence which the proponent can procure through 
reasonable efforts; and (C) the general purposes of these rules 
and the interests of justice will best be served by admission of 
the statement into evidence.  However, a statement may not be 
admitted under this exception unless the proponent of it makes 
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stated previously, our standard of review is plenary where the 
admissibility of hearsay evidence "implicates the application of 
a legally set standard."  See supra part III. 
 As a preliminary matter, we note that the plain 
language of the rule requires the proponent of the hearsay 
statement to put the adverse party on notice that the proponent 
intends to introduce the statement into evidence.  We have 
interpreted this to mean that the proponent must give notice of 
the hearsay statement itself as well as the proponent's intention 
specifically to rely on the rule as a grounds for admissibility 
of the hearsay statement.  United States v. Pelullo, 964 F.2d 
193, 202 (3d Cir. 1992) (citing United States v. Furst, 886 F.2d 
558, 574 (3d Cir. 1989)).  Even assuming arguendo that Owens-
Corning was on notice that Kirk intended to introduce this 
evidence at trial, we observe from the record that Kirk never 
gave notice to Owens-Corning that she intended to introduce this 
evidence under Rule 803(24).  App. at 512.  We recognize that the 
advance notice requirement of Rule 803(24) can be met where the 
proponent of the evidence is without fault in failing to notify 
his adversary and the trial judge has offered sufficient time, by 
means of granting a continuance, for the opponent to prepare to 
contest its admission.  See United States v. Bailey, 581 F.2d 
                                                                  
known to the adverse party sufficiently in advance of the trial 
or hearing to provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity 
to prepare to meet it, the proponent's intention to offer the 
statement and the particulars of it, including the name and 
address of the declarant. 
 
Fed. R. Evid. 803(24) (emphasis added).  
45 
341, 348 (3d Cir. 1978) (the purposes of the rule and the 
requirement of fairness are satisfied under such circumstances). 
Because of the lack of notice by Kirk that she intended to rely 
on Rule 803(24) and the lack of a showing by Kirk as to why it 
was not possible to provide Owens-Corning with notice, the 
district court erred in admitting this evidence at trial. 
 Turning to the substance of the rule itself, we note 
that in order for the hearsay statement to be admitted, it must 
have "equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness." 
Fed. R. Evid. 803(24); see also Michael H. Graham, Federal 
Practice and Procedure: Evidence § 6775, at 737-39 (Interim 
Edition 1992) (factors bearing on trustworthiness include the 
declarant's partiality, i.e., interest or bias).  Owens-Corning 
argues that the interrogatories of Garlock lack trustworthiness 
and are self-serving.  Kirk submits that the interrogatory 
answers are trustworthy because they are signed and sworn under 
penalty of perjury.0  We find that an interrogatory response of a 
co-defendant who is seeking to avoid liability lacks the 
"circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness" that are 
contemplated by Rule 803(24) of the Federal Rules of Evidence. 
Garlock had every incentive to set forth the facts in a light 
                     
0There is nothing in the record to indicate that the district 
court made any findings as to the reliability of the Garlock 
interrogatories.  See United States v. Chu Kong Yin, 935 F.2d 
990, 1000 (9th Cir. 1991) (requiring specific findings regarding 
the requisite elements of Rule 803(24)); United States v. 
Tafollo-Cardenas, 897 F.2d 976, 980 (9th Cir. 1990) (district 
court must find that the statements met the requirements of the 
rule in order for the appellate court to consider the 
admissibility of the statement under 803(24)). 
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most favorable to itself, while at the same time still answering 
the interrogatories truthfully.  See United States v. DeLuca, 692 
F.2d 1277, 1285 (9th Cir. 1982) (excluding statement under 
residual hearsay exception because of motive to exculpate oneself 
after indictment or investigation).  Using these interrogatory 
responses to prove that Garlock products could not have caused 
the decedent's illness without the opportunity for cross-
examination implicates many of the dangers the hearsay rule is 
designed to prevent.  Accordingly, the district court erred in 
admitting this evidence. 
   
V.  Delay Damages   
 Finally, Owens-Corning argues that it was improper as a 
matter of law for the district court to award delay damages to 
the plaintiff pursuant to Rule 238 of the Pennsylvania Rules of 
Civil Procedure because it is a procedural rule and should not be 
applied by federal courts sitting in diversity.  Owens-Corning 
argues in the alternative that even if it is permissible for a 
federal court sitting in diversity to award delay damages 
pursuant to Rule 238, it was improper here because: (1) the 
entire delay was caused by the plaintiff's strategic decision to 
file simultaneous federal and state court actions and her failure 
to request a remand of the federal action from the multidistrict 
docket when settlement negotiations reached an impasse and (2) 
the district court miscalculated the damage award in failing to 
account for a delay of approximately two years that was caused by 
a judicial stay imposed by the Panel on Multidistrict Litigation. 
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Owens-Corning maintains that because it was not responsible for 
the delay, it should not be required to pay delay damages for 
that period. 
 
A.  Rule 238 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil 
Procedure -- Substantive or Procedural? 
       
 First, we must address Owens-Corning's argument that a 
federal court sitting in diversity cannot apply Rule 238 of the 
Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure because it is a procedural 
rather than a substantive rule.  Yet, ultimately, Owens-Corning 
concedes, as it must, that this question has already been decided 
by this Court in Fauber v. Kem Transportation and Equipment Co., 
876 F.2d 327 (3d Cir. 1989).  In that case, we held that Rule 238 
is substantive and must be followed by federal courts sitting in 
diversity cases.  Id. at 328.  Counsel is thus implicitly asking 
this panel to overrule Fauber.  We note that this Court's 
Internal Operating Procedures prohibit a panel of this Court from 
overruling a published opinion of a previous panel.  See Internal 
Operating Procedure Rule 9.1 ("[T]he holding of a panel in a 
reported opinion is binding on subsequent panels.").  Because we 
are bound by Fauber, and in any event do not question its wisdom, 
we reiterate that it is proper for a federal district court 
sitting in diversity to award delay damages to a plaintiff under 
Rule 238 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure. 
 
B.  Did Plaintiff Cause Delay? 
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 Second, Owens-Corning maintains that Kirk was 
responsible for the delay because she filed simultaneous federal 
and state court actions and additionally failed to make an 
application to remand the federal action from the multidistrict 
docket when settlement negotiations proved fruitless. 
 Our review of the applicability of Rule 238 in a 
diversity case is plenary.  Fauber, 876 F.2d at 329.  Rule 238 of 
the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure states in relevant 
part: 
   (a)(1) At the request of the plaintiff in 
a civil action seeking monetary relief for . 
. . death[,] . . . damages for delay shall be 
added to the amount of compensatory damages 
awarded against each defendant . . . found to 
be liable to the plaintiff in the verdict of 
a jury . . . . 
      (2) Damages for delay shall be awarded 
for the period of time 
         (i) in an action commenced before 
August 1, 1989, from the date the plaintiff 
first filed a complaint or from a date one 
year after the accrual of the cause of 
action, whichever is later, up to the date of 
the . . . verdict . . . . 
      (3) Damages for delay shall be 
calculated at the rate equal to the prime 
rate as listed in the first edition of the 
Wall Street Journal published for each 
calendar year for which the damages are 
awarded, plus one percent, not compounded. 
   (b) The period of time for which damages 
for delay shall be calculated under 
subdivision (a)(2) shall exclude the period 
of time, if any, 
      (1) after which the defendant has made 
a written offer of 
         (i) settlement in a specified sum 
with prompt cash payment to the plaintiff, or 
         (ii) a structured settlement 
underwritten by a financially responsible 
entity, and continued that offer in effect 
for at least ninety days or until 
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commencement of trial, whichever first 
occurs, which offer was not accepted and the 
plaintiff did not recover by award, verdict 
or decision, exclusive of damages for delay, 
more than 125 percent of either the specified 
sum or the actual cost of the structured 
settlement plus any cash payment to the 
plaintiff; or 
      (2) during which the plaintiff caused 
delay of the trial. 
Pa. R. Civ. P. 238 (1988) (emphasis added). 
 According to the plain language of the rule, a 
defendant must pay delay damages unless the delay falls within 
the excludable time as set forth in the rule.  Owens-Corning 
concedes that it did not make a settlement offer which would 
satisfy the rule.  Thus, the only other way for the defendant to 
be relieved from paying delay damages would be if the plaintiff 
caused the delay. 
 According to Owens-Corning, but for the plaintiff's 
strategic decision to file a federal asbestos action, the matter 
could have been resolved long ago in state court.  Here, Kirk 
would have been forced to abandon her remedy in federal court and 
seek relief only in the state forum.  To adopt the rule of law as 
advocated by Owens-Corning, we would be required to hold that 
delay is per se attributable to a plaintiff anytime a plaintiff 
files a diversity action in federal court when a suitable state 
forum exists.  Nothing in Rule 238 contemplates that a plaintiff 
must forgo any rights in order to be entitled to delay damages, 
and we are unwilling to adopt such a proposition. 
 In support of its argument that Kirk was responsible 
for the delay in failing to request a remand from the 
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multidistrict docket, Owens-Corning relies on Babich v. 
Pittsburgh & New England Trucking Co., 386 Pa. Super. 482, 563 
A.2d 168 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989).  In that case, the plaintiff's 
motion for delay damages pursuant to Rule 238 was denied by the 
trial court and plaintiff appealed.  Babich, 386 Pa. Super. at 
487, 563 A.2d at 171.  In assessing who was responsible for the 
almost seven year delay between the commencement of suit and the 
jury verdict, the court observed: 
[T]he chief reasons for delay in this case 
cannot be attributed to defendants.  [One of 
the defendants] filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy 
in federal court six months after 
[plaintiff's] complaint was filed and 
[plaintiff] did not successfully obtain 
relief from the automatic stay until 
approximately two years and four months later 
despite cooperation from counsel for the 
bankruptcy and counsel for the insurance 
company.  The other primary delay in the case 
was [plaintiff's] failure to place the case 
at issue in a speedy fashion.  [Plaintiff] 
fails to point to any delay attributable to 
defendants and we find none upon review of 
the record. 
Babich, 386 Pa. Super. at 487, 563 A.2d at 171. 
 Owens-Corning argues that because Kirk did not seek a 
remand from the multidistrict docket, she failed to obtain relief 
from the MDL stay just as the plaintiff in Babich failed to 
obtain relief from the automatic stay.  Owens-Corning's reliance 
on Babich is misplaced.  In that case plaintiff could have sought 
relief and moved the trial along, because opposing counsel was 
cooperating with and assisting counsel.  Here, however, according 
to Judge Weiner's Pretrial Order, the case could be remanded for 
trial only if there was a finding that the defendant was acting 
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in bad faith during the settlement negotiations.  To the extent 
that Owens-Corning is found to have acted in bad faith, this 
would militate against a finding that delay was caused by the 
plaintiff. 
 
C.  Is Delay Not Caused By The Defendant Excludable?      
 Third, Owens-Corning argues that because the delay was 
caused by the MDL Order, it offends traditional notions of fair 
play and due process to make a defendant pay for another's delay. 
Owens-Corning asks that the award of delay damages be 
recalculated and further maintains that it is unconstitutional to 
impose delay damages on it for this time period because it was 
never acting in bad faith and the delay was caused by the court. 
Were we to adopt the rule of law as articulated by Owens-Corning, 
we would have to redraft Rule 238(b)(2) to state "during which 
the defendant did not cause the delay of the trial," instead of 
"during which the plaintiff caused delay of the trial."  We are 
not so inclined and we find that the plaintiff caused no delay of 
the trial. 
 Owens-Corning also argues that notwithstanding the 
language of the rule, requiring it to pay for delay caused by the 
judiciary is a violation of due process.  Owens-Corning fails to 
comprehend the theory underlying Rule 238.  Delay damages merely 
compensate a plaintiff for money that he or she would have earned 
on the award if he or she had promptly received it.  Costa v. 
Lauderdale Beach Hotel, 534 Pa. 154, 160, 626 A.2d 566, 569 (Pa. 
1993).  The rule also functions to prevent a defendant from being 
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unjustly enriched by keeping interest that could be earned during 
the litigation process on what is essentially the plaintiff's 
money.  Id. n.6.  We find no merit to Owens-Corning's argument 
that delay damages violate due process in this instance. 
Accordingly, we find no error in the district court's decision to 
award delay damages to the plaintiff.   
 
VI. Conclusion 
 The refusal to remove two jurors who were challenged 
for cause was an abuse of discretion.  Because the defendant was 
required to waste two of its peremptory strikes in order to 
remedy this error, a per se reversal is required.  Allowing into 
evidence the prior testimony of a witness in an unrelated state 
court trial was error, as was permitting the introduction into 
evidence of an answer to an interrogatory by a settled co-
defendant.  Accordingly, we will reverse the judgment of the 
district court and remand the matter to the district court for a 
new trial.  Costs taxed against Kirk. 
